Are humans unique in having self-reflective consciousness? Or can
precursors to this central form of human consciousness be found in
non-human species? The Missing Link in Cognition brings together a
diverse group of researchers who have been investigating this
question from a variety of perspectives, including the extent to
which non-human primates, and, indeed, young children, have
consciousness, a sense of self, thought process, metacognitions,
and representations. Some of the participants--Kitcher, Higgins,
Nelson, and Tulving--argue that these types of cognitive abilities
are uniquely human, whereas others--Call, Hampton, Kinsbourne,
Menzel, Metcalfe, Schwartz, Smith, and Terrace--are convinced that
at least the precursors to self-reflective consciousness exist in
non-human primates.
Their debate focuses primarily on the underpinnings of
consciousness. Some of the participants believe that consciousness
depends on representational thought and on the mental manipulation
of such representations. Is representational thought enough to
ensure consciousness, or does one need more? If one needs more,
exactly what is needed? Is reflection upon the representations,
that is, metacognition, the link? Does a realization of the
contingencies, that is, "knowing that," in Gilbert Ryle's
terminology, ensure that a person or an animal is conscious? Is
true episodic memory needed for consciousness, and if so, do any
animals have it? Is it possible to have episodic memory or, indeed,
any self-reflective processing, without language?
Other participants believe that consciousness is inextricably
intertwined with a sense of self or self-awareness. From where does
this sense of self or self-awareness arise? Some of the
participants believe that it develops only through the use of
language and the narrative form. If it does develop in this way,
what about claims of a sense of self or self-awareness in non-human
animals? Others believe that the autobiographical record implied by
episodic memory is fundamental. To what extent must non-human
animals have the linguistic, metacognitive, and/or representational
abilities to develop a sense of self or self-awareness? These and
other related concerns are crucial in this volume's lively debate
over the nature of the missing cognitive link, and whether
gorillas, chimps, or other species might be more like humans than
many have supposed.
General
Is the information for this product incomplete, wrong or inappropriate?
Let us know about it.
Does this product have an incorrect or missing image?
Send us a new image.
Is this product missing categories?
Add more categories.
Review This Product
No reviews yet - be the first to create one!