Coalition Politics and Economic Development challenges the
conventional wisdom that coalition government hinders necessary
policy reform in developing countries. Irfan Nooruddin presents a
fresh theory that institutionalized gridlock, by reducing policy
volatility and stabilizing investor expectations, is actually good
for economic growth. Successful national economic performance, he
argues, is the consequence of having the right configuration of
national political institutions. Countries in which leaders must
compromise to form policy are better able to commit credibly to
investors and therefore enjoy higher and more stable rates of
economic development. Quantitative analysis of business surveys and
national economic data together with historical case studies of
five countries provide evidence for these claims. This is an
original analysis of the relationship between political
institutions and national economic performance in the developing
world and will appeal to scholars and advanced students of
political economy, economic development and comparative politics.
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