Freedom of the sort implicated in acting freely or with free
will is important to the truth of different sorts of moral
judgment, such as judgments of moral responsibility and those of
moral obligation. Little thought, however, has been invested into
whether appraisals of good or evil presuppose free will. This
important topic has not commanded the attention it deserves owing
to what is perhaps a prevalent assumption that freedom leaves
judgments concerning good and evil largely unaffected. The central
aim of this book is to dispute this assumption by arguing for the
relevance of free will to the truth of two sorts of such judgment:
welfare-ranking judgments or judgments of personal well-being (when
is one's life intrinsically good for the one who lives it?), and
world-ranking judgments (when is a possible world intrinsically
better than another?). The book also examines free will's impact on
the truth of such judgments for central issues in moral obligation
and in the free will debate. This book should be of interest to
those working on intrinsic value, personal well-being, moral
obligation, and free will.
General
Is the information for this product incomplete, wrong or inappropriate?
Let us know about it.
Does this product have an incorrect or missing image?
Send us a new image.
Is this product missing categories?
Add more categories.
Review This Product
No reviews yet - be the first to create one!