Diplomatic histories of disputes between two sides usually concern
the gradual narrowing of broad differences through negotiation. But
in the nearly four years (1992-1996) of Israeli-Syrian negotiations
chronicled here, readers delve instead into the nature of a
protracted stalemate. Despite the book's title, Rabinovich
(History/Tel Aviv Univ.), Jerusalem's chief negotiator with
Damascus, acknowledges that "at no point . . . were Israel and
Syria on the verge of a breakthrough." The primary reason was the
lack of what diplomats call "ripeness," i.e., each side's
readiness, ideologically and strategically, to come to terms with
the primary concerns of the other. This was particularly the case
with Syrian president Assad, who was and remains far more hard-line
in his approach to Israel than were his Jordanian, Palestinian, and
Egyptian counterparts. At one point, he commented to US Secretary
of State Warren Christopher that his side felt uncomfortable with
the term "normalization." Thus, he adopted a diplomatic stance that
was a "non-starter": he made full Israeli withdrawal from the Golan
Heights a precondition for any peace with Israel, while remaining
maddeningly vague about what he meant by the term "peace." Unlike
the late Egyptian president Sadat, and also unlike Jordan's King
Hussein and even Yassir Arafat, Assad engaged only in sporadic,
limited, and often clumsy "public diplomacy" in trying to influence
the Israeli public. Rabinovich writes clearly and fair-mindedly
about the views of both sides; his readers gain a ringside seat at
Arab-Israeli diplomacy at its most difficult. But he relates a
story of such long and intricate diplomatic pettiness,
frustrations, and disappointments that it will interest academic
mavens of recent Mideast affairs, yet hold only limited appeal for
the general reader. (Kirkus Reviews)
A major casualty of the assassin's bullet that struck down
Israeli Prime Minister Yitzhak Rabin was a prospective peace accord
between Syria and Israel. For the first time, a negotiator who had
unique access to Rabin, as well as detailed knowledge of Syrian
history and politics, tells the inside story of the failed
negotiations. His account provides a key to understanding not only
U.S. diplomacy in the Middle East but also the larger Arab-Israeli
peace process.
During the period from 1992 to 1996, Itamar Rabinovich was
Israel's ambassador to Washington, and the chief negotiator with
Syria. In this book, he looks back at the course of negotiations,
terms of which were known to a surprisingly small group of
American, Israeli, and Syrian officials. After Benjamin Netanyahu's
election as Israel's prime minister in May 1996, a controversy
developed. Even with Netanyahu's change of policy and harder line
toward Damascus, Syria began claiming that both Rabin and his
successor Peres had pledged full withdrawal from the Golan Heights.
Rabinovich takes the reader through the maze of diplomatic
subtleties to explain the differences between hypothetical
discussion and actual commitment.
"To the students of past history and contemporary politics," he
writes, "nothing is more beguiling than the myriad threads that run
across the invisible line which separates the two." The threads of
this story include details of Rabin's negotiations and their impact
through two subsequent Israeli administrations in less than a year,
the American and Egyptian roles, and the ongoing debate between
Syria and Israel on the factual and legal bases for resuming
talks.
The author portrays all sides and participants with remarkable
flair and empathy, as only a privileged player in the events could
do. In any assessment of future negotiations in the Middle East,
Itamar Rabinovich's book will prove indispensable.
General
Is the information for this product incomplete, wrong or inappropriate?
Let us know about it.
Does this product have an incorrect or missing image?
Send us a new image.
Is this product missing categories?
Add more categories.
Review This Product
No reviews yet - be the first to create one!