The Law of the Sea (LOS) treaty resulted from some of the most
complicated multilateral negotiations ever conducted. Difficult
bargaining produced a remarkably sophisticated agreement on the
financial aspects of deep ocean mining and on the financing of a
new international mining entity. This book analyzes those
negotiations along with the abrupt U.S. rejection of their results.
Building from this episode, it derives important and subtle general
rules and propositions for reaching superior, sustainable
agreements in complex bargaining situations. James Sebenius shows
how agreements were possible among the parties because and not in
spite of differences in their values, expectations, and attitudes
toward time and risk. He shows how linking separately intractable
issues can generate a zone of possible agreement. He analyzes the
extensive role of a computer model in the LOS talks. Finally, he
argues that in many negotiations neither the issues nor the parties
are fixed and develops analytic techniques that predict how the
addition or deletion of either issues or parties may affect the
process of reaching agreement.
General
Is the information for this product incomplete, wrong or inappropriate?
Let us know about it.
Does this product have an incorrect or missing image?
Send us a new image.
Is this product missing categories?
Add more categories.
Review This Product
No reviews yet - be the first to create one!