James McAllister outlines a new account of early Cold War
history, one that focuses on the emergence of a bipolar structure
of power, the continuing importance of the German question, and
American efforts to create a united Western Europe. Challenging the
conventional wisdom among both international relations theorists
and Cold War historians, McAllister argues that America's central
objective from the Second World War to the mid-1950s was to create
a European order that could be peaceful and stable without
requiring the permanent presence of American ground forces on the
continent.
The permanent presence of American forces in Europe is often
seen as a lesson that policymakers drew from the disastrous
experiences of two world wars, but McAllister's archival research
reveals that both FDR and Eisenhower, as well as influential
strategists such as George Kennan, did not draw this lesson. In the
short term, American power was necessary to balance the Soviet
Union and reassure Western Europe about the revival of German
power, but America's long-term objective was to create the
conditions under which Western Europe could take care of both of
these problems on their own.
In the author's view, the key element of this strategy was the
creation of the European Defense Community. If Western Germany
could be successfully integrated and rearmed within the context of
the EDC, Western Europe would have taken the most important step to
becoming a superpower on par with the United States and the Soviet
Union. Understanding why this strategy was pursued and why it
failed, McAllister asserts, has important implications for both
international relations theory and contemporary questions of
American foreign policy.
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