This monograph examines the British experience in building and
training indigenous police and military forces during the Malaya
and Cyprus insurgencies. The two insurgencies provide a dramatic
contrast to the issue of training local security forces. In Malaya,
the British developed a very successful strategy for training the
Malayan police and army. In Cyprus, the British strategy for
building and training local security forces generally was
ineffective. The author argues that some important lessons can be
drawn from these case studies that apply directly to current U.S.
counterinsurgency doctrine. The research for this monograph was
carried out while the author was a visiting fellow of All Souls
College, Oxford University. The author used the superb library and
archive of the Rhodes House Centre for Imperial and Commonwealth
History at Oxford University. The Strategic Studies Institute is
pleased to offer this contribution to the current debate on
counterinsurgency doctrine.
General
Is the information for this product incomplete, wrong or inappropriate?
Let us know about it.
Does this product have an incorrect or missing image?
Send us a new image.
Is this product missing categories?
Add more categories.
Review This Product
No reviews yet - be the first to create one!
Welcome to Loot.co.za!
Sign in / Register |Wishlists & Gift Vouchers |Help | Advanced search
