Conventional wisdom dictates that the conditions of
international politics require states to pursue "tough" strategies
based on threats, ruling out "soft" strategies such as reassurances
or appeasement. In "Threats and Promises, " James W. Davis, Jr.,
works toward a theory of influence in international politics that
recognizes the power of promises and assurances as tools of
statecraft.
Davis offers an analytic treatment of promises and assurances,
drawing on relevant strands of international relations theory and
deterrence theory, as well as cognitive and social psychology.
Building on prospect theory (from cognitive psychology), he
develops a testable theory of influence that suggests promises are
most effective when potential aggressors are motivated by a desire
to avoid loss. Davis then considers a series of case studies drawn
principally from German diplomatic relations in the later
nineteenth and early twentieth century. From the case
studies--which focus on such issues as European stability, colonial
competition, and the outbreak of the First World War--Davis shows
how a blending of threats and promises according to reasoned
principles can lead to a new system of more creative
statecraft.
While many critical analyses exist on the use of threats, there
are relatively few on the use of promises. Davis argues that
promises have been central to outcomes that were previously
attributed to the successful use of deterrent threats, as well as
the resolution of many crises where threats failed to deter
aggression. "Threats and Promises" challenges the conventional
wisdom and is an original contribution to the field of
international politics.
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