The study of institutions, a core concept in comparative politics,
has produced many rich and influential theories on the economic and
political effects of institutions, yet it has been less successful
at theorizing their origins. In Fixing Democracy, Javier Corrales
develops a theory of institutional origins that concentrates on
constitutions and levels of power within them. He reviews numerous
Latin American constituent assemblies and constitutional amendments
to explore why some democracies expand rather than restrict
presidential powers and why this heightened presidentialism
discourages democracy. His signal theoretical contribution is his
elaboration on power asymmetries. Corrales determines that
conditions of reduced power asymmetry make constituent assemblies
more likely to curtail presidential powers, while weaker opposition
and heightened power asymmetry is an indicator that presidential
powers will expand. The bargain-based theory that he uses focuses
on power distribution and provides a more accurate variable in
predicting actual constitutional outcomes than other approaches
based on functionalism or ideology. While the empirical focus is
Latin America, Fixing Democracy contributes a broadly applicable
theory to the scholarship both institutions and democracy.
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