The financial crisis has been blamed on reckless bankers,
irrational exuberance, government support of mortgages for the
poor, financial deregulation, and expansionary monetary policy.
Specialists in banking, however, tell a story with less emotional
resonance but a better correspondence to the evidence: the crisis
was sparked by the international regulatory accords on bank capital
levels, the Basel Accords.In one of the first studies critically to
examine the Basel Accords, "Engineering the Financial Crisis"
reveals the crucial role that bank capital requirements and other
government regulations played in the recent financial crisis.
Jeffrey Friedman and Wladimir Kraus argue that by encouraging banks
to invest in highly rated mortgage-backed bonds, the Basel Accords
created an overconcentration of risk in the banking industry. In
addition, accounting regulations required banks to reduce lending
if the temporary market value of these bonds declined, as they did
in 2007 and 2008 during the panic over subprime mortgage
defaults.The book begins by assessing leading theories about the
crisis--deregulation, bank compensation practices, excessive
leverage, "too big to fail," and Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac--and,
through careful evidentiary scrutiny, debunks much of the
conventional wisdom about what went wrong. It then discusses the
Basel Accords and how they contributed to systemic risk. Finally,
it presents an analysis of social-science expertise and the
fallibility of economists and regulators. Engagingly written,
theoretically inventive, yet empirically grounded, "Engineering the
Financial Crisis" is a timely examination of the unintended--and
sometimes disastrous--effects of regulation on complex
economies.
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