Great powers often initiate risky military and diplomatic
inventions in far-off, peripheral regions that pose no direct
threat to them, risking direct confrontation with rivals in
strategically inconsequential places. Why do powerful countries
behave in a way that leads to entrapment in prolonged, expensive,
and self-defeating conflicts? Jeffrey W. Taliaferro suggests that
such interventions are driven by the refusal of senior officials to
accept losses in their state's relative power, international
status, or prestige. Instead of cutting their losses, leaders often
continue to invest blood and money in failed excursions into the
periphery. Their policies may seem to be driven by rational
concerns about power and security, but Taliaferro deems them to be
at odds with the master explanation of political realism.
Taliaferro constructs a "balance-of-risk" theory of foreign policy
that draws on defensive realism (in international relations) and
prospect theory (in psychology). He illustrates the power of this
new theory in several case narratives: Germany's initiation and
escalation of the 1905 and 1911 Moroccan crises, the United States'
involvement in the Korean War in 1950–52, and Japan's
entanglement in the second Sino-Japanese war in 1937–40 and its
decisions for war with the U.S. in 1940–41.
General
Imprint: |
Cornell University Press
|
Country of origin: |
United States |
Series: |
Cornell Studies in Security Affairs |
Release date: |
March 2004 |
First published: |
March 2004 |
Authors: |
Jeffrey W. Taliaferro
|
Dimensions: |
235 x 155 x 25mm (L x W x T) |
Format: |
Hardcover
|
Pages: |
336 |
Edition: |
New |
ISBN-13: |
978-0-8014-4221-6 |
Categories: |
Books
|
LSN: |
0-8014-4221-4 |
Barcode: |
9780801442216 |
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