From a moral point of view we think of ourselves as capable of
responsible actions. From a scientific point of view we think of
ourselves as animals whose behaviour, however highly evolved,
conforms to natural scientific laws. Natural Agency argues that
these different perspectives can be reconciled, despite the
scepticism of many philosophers who have argued that 'free will' is
impossible under 'scientific determinism'. This scepticism is best
overcome, according to the author, by defending a causal theory of
action, that is by establishing that actions are constituted by
behavourial events with the appropriate kind of mental causal
history. He sets out a rich and subtle argument for such a theory
and defends it against its critics. Thus the book demonstrates the
importance of philosophical work in action theory for the central
metaphysical task of understanding our place in nature.
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