Rationalizing Parliament examines how institutional arrangements in
the French Constitution shape the bargaining strategies of
political parties. The book investigates the decision by French
cities to include in the Constitution legislative procedures aimed
to 'rationalize' the policy-making role of parliament and analyses
the impact of these procedures on policy outcomes, cabinet
stability and political accountability. Drawing on diverse
methodological approaches, including formal models, multivariate
statistics, historical analysis and qualitative case studies,
Professor Huber contributes to general theoretical debates about
the endogenous choice of institutions, and about the exogenous
impact of institutional arrangements on political decision-making.
Through its use of theories developed in the American politics
literature, the study reveals important similarities between
legislative politics in the United States and in parliamentary
systems and shortcomings in conventional interpretations of French
institutional arrangements.
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