In this book, John Roemer presents a unified and rigorous theory of
political competition between parties. He models the theory under
many specifications, including whether parties are policy oriented
or oriented toward winning, whether they are certain or uncertain
about voter preferences, and whether the policy space is uni- or
multidimensional. He examines all eight possible combinations of
these choice assumptions, and characterizes their equilibria.
He fleshes out a model in which each party is composed of three
different factions concerned with winning, with policy, and with
publicity. Parties compete with one another. When internal
bargaining is combined with external competition, a natural
equilibrium emerges, which Roemer calls party-unanimity Nash
equilibrium.
Assuming only the distribution of voter preferences and the
endowments of the population, he deduces the nature of the parties
that will form. He then applies the theory to several empirical
puzzles, including income distribution, patterns of electoral
success, and why there is no labor party in the United States.
General
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