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Securities against Misrule - Juries, Assemblies, Elections (Hardcover, New)
Loot Price: R2,094
Discovery Miles 20 940
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Securities against Misrule - Juries, Assemblies, Elections (Hardcover, New)
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Elster proposes a normative theory of collective decision making,
inspired by Jeremy Bentham but not including his utilitarian
philosophy. The central proposal is that in designing democratic
institutions one should reduce as much as possible the impact of
self-interest, passion, prejudice and bias on the decision makers,
and then let the chips fall where they may. There is no
independently defined good outcome that institutions can track, nor
is there any way of reliably selecting good decision makers. In
addition to a long initial chapter that surveys theories of
collective decision making, notably social choice theory, and a
chapter expounding and discussing Bentham's views, historical
chapters on the jury, constituent assemblies and electoral systems
develop and illustrate the main ideas. This work draws on a welter
of case studies and historical episodes, from Thucydides and
Plutarch to the present. It is also grounded in psychology,
behavioral economics and law.
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