This book was first published in 2008. Assume, for a moment, that
the necessary tools are available to induce or even force states to
comply with international law. In such a state of affairs, how
strongly should international law be protected? More specifically,
how easy should it be to change international law? Should treaties
be specifically performed or should states be given an opportunity
to 'pay their way out'? In the event of states violating their
commitments, what kind of back-up enforcement or sanctions should
be imposed? Joost Pauwelyn uses the distinction between liability
rules, property protection and inalienable entitlements as a
starting point for a new theory of variable protection of
international law, placed at the intersection between 'European
absolutism' and 'American voluntarism'. Rather than undermining
international law, variable protection takes the normativity of
international law seriously and calibrates it to achieve maximum
welfare and effectiveness at the lowest cost to contractual freedom
and legitimacy.
General
Is the information for this product incomplete, wrong or inappropriate?
Let us know about it.
Does this product have an incorrect or missing image?
Send us a new image.
Is this product missing categories?
Add more categories.
Review This Product
No reviews yet - be the first to create one!