This book addresses the following question: why are presidential
democracies more likely to break down than parliamentary ones?
Conventional wisdom among political scientists pointS to the
incentives generated by the form of government itself; the
independence of the executive and legislature that defines
presidentialism generates incentives that are not conducive to the
consolidation of democracy. On the basis of a data set that covers
all democracies between 1946 and 2002, this book demonstrates that
this is not the case: the incentives generated by presidentialism
are as conducive to the consolidation of democracy as the ones
generated by parliamentarism. The book argues that what kills
presidentialism is the fact that it exists in countries where
democracies of any type are not likely to survive. This book will
be of interest to academic researchers, graduates and advanced
undergraduates enrolled in courses on comparative politics and
political economy.
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