The reporting of performance measures and standards in budgeting is
expected to strengthen the accountability of results, at the same
time lessening the need for compliance with burdensome rules and
regulations. Reduction in rules and red tape is anticipated to
provide greater discretion, allowing administrators to better
utilize their expertise in budget decisions. However, does this in
fact happen? Is there is evidence that performance budget reform
increases administrative discretion? This book examines that
question by testing the fit between reform expectations and reform
outcomes as viewed by practitioners. It argues that performance
budget reform will not realize change as predicted by its
advocates, because this theory of reform does not sufficiently
consider the organizational realities of public administrators
today; that is, an environment characterized by multiple and often
conflicting accountability claims.
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