Appointing Central Bankers - The Politics of Monetary Policy in the United States and the European Monetary Union (Paperback, New ed)

This book examines monetary policy by focusing on how the President and the Senate influence monetary policy by appointing Federal Reserve members. It attempts to answer three questions about the appointment process and its effects. First, do politicians influence monetary policy through Federal Reserve appointments? Second, who influences the process - the President alone or both the President and the Senate? Third, what explains the structure of the Federal Reserve appointment process? The test models show that the President alone, both the President and Senate, or neither, may influence monetary policy with Federal Reserve appointments. The structure of the process reflects political battles between the Democrats and Republicans regarding the centralization of authority to set monetary policy within the Federal Reserve System. The study extends the analysis to the European Central Bank and shows that the Federal Reserve process is more representative of society than the European Central Bank process.

General

Imprint:	Cambridge UniversityPress
Country of origin:	United Kingdom
Series:	Political Economy of Institutions and Decisions
Release date:	November 2006
First published:	June 2006
Authors:	Kelly H. Chang
Dimensions:	227 x 150 x 13mm (L x W x T)
Format:	Paperback - Trade
Pages:	176
Edition:	New ed
ISBN-13:	978-0-521-02984-1
Categories:	Books > Social sciences > Politics & government > Political science & theory Promotions
LSN:	0-521-02984-8
Barcode:	9780521029841

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