A timely investigation into the conditions that make international
agreements—and the institutions that enforce them—vulnerable.
When do international institutions effectively promote economic
cooperation among countries and help them resolve conflict?
Although the international system lacks any central governing
authority, states have created rules, particularly around
international economic relations, and empowered international
tribunals to enforce those rules. Just how successful are these
institutions? In Delivering on Promises Lauren J. Peritz
demonstrates that these international courts do indeed deliver
results—but they are only effective under certain
conditions. As Peritz shows, states are less likely to
comply with international rules and international court decisions
when domestic industries have the political ability to obstruct
compliance in particular cases. The author evaluates the argument
with an extensive empirical analysis that traces the domestic
politics of compliance with the decisions of two international
economic courts: the World Trade Organization’s dispute
settlement mechanism and the Court of Justice of the European
Union. At a time when international agreements are under attack,
this book sheds light on the complex relationship between domestic
politics and international economic cooperation, offering detailed
evidence that international economic courts are effective at
promoting interstate cooperation. Â
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