A timely investigation into the conditions that make international
agreements-and the institutions that enforce them-vulnerable. When
do international institutions effectively promote economic
cooperation among countries and help them resolve conflict?
Although the international system lacks any central governing
authority, states have created rules, particularly around
international economic relations, and empowered international
tribunals to enforce those rules. Just how successful are these
institutions? In Delivering on Promises Lauren J. Peritz
demonstrates that these international courts do indeed deliver
results-but they are only effective under certain conditions. As
Peritz shows, states are less likely to comply with international
rules and international court decisions when domestic industries
have the political ability to obstruct compliance in particular
cases. The author evaluates the argument with an extensive
empirical analysis that traces the domestic politics of compliance
with the decisions of two international economic courts: the World
Trade Organization's dispute settlement mechanism and the Court of
Justice of the European Union. At a time when international
agreements are under attack, this book sheds light on the complex
relationship between domestic politics and international economic
cooperation, offering detailed evidence that international economic
courts are effective at promoting interstate cooperation.
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