Why are politicians able to form electoral coalitions that bridge
ethnic divisions in some countries and not others? This book
answers this question by presenting a theory of pecuniary coalition
building in multi-ethnic countries governed through patronage.
Focusing on sub-Saharan Africa, the book explains how the relative
autonomy of business from state-controlled capital affects
political bargaining among opposition politicians in particular.
While incumbents form coalitions by using state resources to secure
cross-ethnic endorsements, opposition politicians must rely on the
private resources of business to do the same. This book combines
cross-national analyses of African countries with in-depth case
studies of Cameroon and Kenya to show that incumbents actively
manipulate financial controls to prevent business from supporting
their opposition. It demonstrates that opposition politicians are
more likely to coalesce across ethnic cleavages once incumbents
have lost their ability to blackmail the business sector through
financial reprisals.
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