Public performance-accountability nexus is a hot topic in recent
research, but we know little about its antecedents and consequences
in developing countries and transition economies. Are top-down
appointed political elites taken accountable for public service
performance in authoritarian nations like China? The question is
theoretically and empirically examined in the book. I argue that
government cadres are appropriately appraised and promoted even
with the lame democracy. Using a novel dataset and event history
analysis method, I test the performance-based political promotion
tournament theory and its contingent features. I find that career
advancement of provincial leading officials is positively
influenced by public service performance but not by economic
performance. The effect is stronger for Party secretaries than
governors, for central connected officials than local officials,
for younger than older, and for short tenure in office than long
serving. The performance-promotion nexus in relatively weak and
contingent on contextual attributes, suggesting performance-based
reform should be deepened to make local agents accountable for
public service delivery and responsiveness.
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