Throughout the world, the rule against price fixing is
competition law's most important and least controversial
prohibition. Yet there is far less consensus than meets the eye on
what constitutes price fixing, and prevalent understandings
conflict with the teachings of oligopoly theory that supposedly
underlie modern competition policy.
"Competition Policy and Price Fixing" provides the needed
analytical foundation. It offers a fresh, in-depth exploration of
competition law's horizontal agreement requirement, presents a
systematic analysis of how best to address the problem of
coordinated oligopolistic price elevation, and compares the
resulting direct approach to the orthodox prohibition.
In doing so, Louis Kaplow elaborates the relevant benefits and
costs of potential solutions, investigates how coordinated price
elevation is best detected in light of the error costs associated
with different types of proof, and examines appropriate sanctions.
Existing literature devotes remarkably little attention to these
key subjects and instead concerns itself with limiting penalties to
certain sorts of interfirm communications. Challenging conventional
wisdom, Kaplow shows how this circumscribed view is less well
grounded in the statutes, principles, and precedents of competition
law than is a more direct, functional proscription. More important,
by comparison to the communications-based prohibition, he explains
how the direct approach targets situations that involve both
greater social harm and less risk of chilling desirable
behavior--and is also easier to apply.
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