As national governments continue to disagree over how to respond to
the aftermath of the global financial crisis, two of the few areas
of consensus were the decisions to increase the IMF's capacity to
respond and remove the policies designed to limit the use of its
resources. Why was this massive increase in the size of the IMF,
accompanied by the removal of policies designed to limit moral
hazard, such an easy point of consensus? Michael Breen looks at the
hidden politics behind IMF lending and proposes a new theory based
on shareholder control. To test this theory, he combines
statistical analysis with a sweeping account of IMF lending and
conditionality during two global crises; the European sovereign
debt crisis and the Asian financial crisis.
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