In the aftermath of the financial crisis, why has the reform
process been incremental although the conditions for more rapid and
abrupt transformations appeared to exist? Is there anything
specific about financial policy that prevents more radical reforms?
Drawing from Comparative Politics and Historical Institutionalism
in particular, as well as International Political Economy, this
book answers these questions by examining the particular
institutional frictions that characterise global financial
governance and influence the activity of agents and veto players
involved in the process of global regulatory change. The chapters
in this volume collectively demonstrate that the process of change
in financial rule-making as well as in the institutions governing
finance does not fit with the punctuated model of policy change.
The book also shows, however, that incremental changes can lead to
fundamental shifts in the basic principles that inform global
financial governance. 'In this timely, tightly argued, and
empirically trenchant study, Moschella and Tsingou provide the
strongest statement yet of why national and international
post-crisis reform packages have fallen short of their most
ambitious goals. Covering virtually every area of the international
fi nancial system, the editors and their collaborators detail the
origins and consequences of incremental policy changes, but note
that, in the end, reforms may produce a subtle transformation in fi
nancial market regulation. Great Expectations, Slow Transformations
will long remain a major resource for scholars of post-crisis
capitalism.' Dr. Orfeo Fioretos, Temple University, Philadelphia,
USA 'The Global Financial Crisis was, by any measure, a great
systemic shock that has so far led to a series of less-than-great
systemic transformations - at least in the area of financial
reform. Moschella and Tsingou explain why this is the case. By
harnessing the insights of historical institutionalism to those of
agent centered constructivism, they show us why great institutional
transformations may take a lot longer, and may be significantly
more contingent, than we generally think.' Mark Blyth, Professor of
International Political Economy, Brown University, Providence, USA
'Many expected the financial collapse of 2007/8 to evoke signifi
cant reform of financial systems around the globe. So far, at
least, national governments have been slow to act. Moschella and
Tsingou's fascinating volume, Great Expectations, Slow
Transformations, helps us understand why. In this thoughtful volume
the editors have pulled together a series of well reasoned and
persuasive essays examining the politics and political economy of
financial reform efforts around the globe. Eschewing the temptation
to blame specific interests and their compliant politicians, these
authors give us a set of nuanced stories that go beyond the
politics of fi nancial reform helping us better understand why
institutional change itself is so diffi cult. This book will be of
great interest both for political economists interested in the
politics of banking and financial regulation in the early 21st
century, as well as for Historical Institutionalists interested in
the politics of institutional change. Sven Steinmo, Professor and
Chair in Political Economy and Public Policy, European University
Institute, Florence, Italy
General
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