Using strategic game theory, this innovative book carefully reviews
the detailed negotiations between industry, regulating agencies and
third parties in environmental policy implementation. The analysis
is underpinned by an institutional comparison of German and US
administrative and environmental law. After presenting an
alternative model to address real-world bargaining, Markus Lehmann
provides an economic rationale for the use of case-to-case
regulation, a policy instrument traditionally neglected if not
rejected by environmental economists. He discusses how and to what
extent the shortcomings of this instrument can be overcome by a
specific institutional design. He presents a clear-cut policy
conclusion which is shown to be quite robust under different model
structures and varying sets of assumptions. This pathbreaking study
will be essential reading for economists studying environmental
economics and political economy, political scientists working on
policy implementation and design, as well as lawyers interested in
administrative law and standing, and the economic theory of the
law.
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