Martin McGuire has written for the specialist and the concerned
layman a highly original and valuable contribution to our
understanding of the arms race, based upon economic theory in
general and the theory of economic duopoly in particular. He calls
attention to the fact that when two world powers face each other
with massive allocations of resources for arms, and when each
regards the other as the major, if not the sole, threat to its own
security, the question of accurate information about the strength
and intentions of the adversary arises for each side in many and
various ways. As a result, this study is a pioneering, analytic
effort to approach the value of keeping secrets from or of
obtaining information about an enemy. The author is concerned with
such questions as: what is the loss in being only 50 percent
confident rather than certain that the adversary doesn't have more
X missiles or missiles of yield W megatons or of accuracy C
thousand feet? Should one insist on being 95 percent sure when
bargaining for arms control? How can a side compensate for its
uncertainty most efficiently? An understanding of these problems
can not only increase our security; it may help as well to contain
or control the entire two-sided race.
General
Imprint: |
Harvard University Press
|
Country of origin: |
United States |
Series: |
Harvard Economic Studies (HUP) |
Release date: |
1965 |
First published: |
1965 |
Authors: |
Martin C McGuire
|
Dimensions: |
214 x 146 x 22mm (L x W x T) |
Format: |
Hardcover - Cloth over boards
|
Pages: |
240 |
ISBN-13: |
978-0-674-79665-2 |
Categories: |
Books >
Business & Economics >
Economics >
General
|
LSN: |
0-674-79665-9 |
Barcode: |
9780674796652 |
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