Supermajority rules govern many features of our lives in common:
from the selection of textbooks for our children's schools to
residential covenants, from the policy choices of state and federal
legislatures to constitutional amendments. It is usually assumed
that these rules are not only normatively unproblematic but
necessary to achieve the goals of institutional stability,
consensus, and minority protections. In this book, Melissa
Schwartzberg challenges the logic underlying the use of
supermajority rule as an alternative to majority decision making.
She traces the hidden history of supermajority decision making,
which originally emerged as an alternative to unanimous rule, and
highlights the tensions in the contemporary use of supermajority
rules as an alternative to majority rule. Although supermajority
rules ostensibly aim to reduce the purported risks associated with
majority decision making, they do so at the cost of introducing new
liabilities associated with the biased judgments they generate and
secure.
General
Imprint: |
Cambridge UniversityPress
|
Country of origin: |
United Kingdom |
Series: |
Cambridge Studies in the Theory of Democracy |
Release date: |
November 2013 |
First published: |
November 2013 |
Authors: |
Melissa Schwartzberg
|
Dimensions: |
215 x 139 x 14mm (L x W x T) |
Format: |
Paperback - Trade
|
Pages: |
248 |
Edition: |
New |
ISBN-13: |
978-0-521-12449-2 |
Categories: |
Books >
Social sciences >
Politics & government >
Political science & theory
|
LSN: |
0-521-12449-2 |
Barcode: |
9780521124492 |
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