Numerous scholars have noticed that certain political institutions,
including federalism, majoritarian electoral systems, and
presidentialism, are linked to lower levels of income
redistribution. This book offers a political geography explanation
for those observed patterns. Each of these institutions is strongly
shaped by geography and provides incentives for politicians to
target their appeals and government resources to localities.
Territorialized institutions also shape citizens' preferences in
ways that can undermine the national coalition in favor of
redistribution. Moreover, territorial institutions increase the
number of veto points in which anti-redistributive actors can
constrain reform efforts. These theoretical connections between the
politics of place and redistributive outcomes are explored in
theory, empirical analysis, and case studies of the USA, Germany,
and Argentina.
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