Virtue as Social Intelligence: An Empirically Grounded Theory
takes on the claims of philosophical situationism, the ethical
theory that is skeptical about the possibility of human virtue.
Influenced by social psychological studies, philosophical
situationists argue that human personality is too fluid and
fragmented to support a stable set of virtues. They claim that
virtue cannot be grounded in empirical psychology. This book argues
otherwise.
Drawing on the work of psychologists Walter Mischel and Yuichi
Shoda, Nancy E. Snow argues that the social psychological
experiments that philosophical situationists rely on look at the
wrong kinds of situations to test for behavioral consistency.
Rather than looking at situations that are objectively similar,
researchers need to compare situations that have similar meanings
for the subject. When this is done, subjects exhibit behavioral
consistencies that warrant the attribution of enduring traits, and
virtues are a subset of these traits. Virtue can therefore be
empirically grounded and virtue ethics has nothing to fear from
philosophical situationism.
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