Ethical subjectivists hold that moral judgements are descriptions
of our attitudes. Expressivists hold that they are expressions of
our attitudes. These views cook with the same ingredients - the
natural world, and our reactions to it - and have similar
attractions. This Element assesses each of them by considering
whether they can accommodate three central features of moral
practice: the practicality of moral judgements, the phenomenon of
moral disagreement, and the mind-independence of some moral truths.
In the process, several different versions of subjectivism are
distinguished (simple, communal, idealising, and normative) and key
expressivist notions such as 'moral attitudes' and 'expression' are
examined. Different meanings of 'subjective' and 'relative' are
examined and it is considered whether subjectivism and expressivism
make ethics 'subjective' or 'relative' in each of these senses.
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