A career of nearly three decades with the CIA and the National
Intelligence Council showed Paul R. Pillar that intelligence
reforms, especially measures enacted since 9/11, can be deeply
misguided. They often miss the sources that underwrite failed
policy and misperceive our ability to read outside influences. They
also misconceive the intelligence-policy relationship and promote
changes that weaken intelligence-gathering operations.
In this book, Pillar confronts the intelligence myths Americans
have come to rely on to explain national tragedies, including the
belief that intelligence drives major national security decisions
and can be fixed to avoid future failures. Pillar believes these
assumptions waste critical resources and create harmful policies,
diverting attention away from smarter reform, and they keep
Americans from recognizing the limits of obtainable knowledge.
Pillar revisits U.S. foreign policy during the Cold War and
highlights the small role intelligence played in those decisions,
and he demonstrates the negligible effect that America's most
notorious intelligence failures had on U.S. policy and interests.
He then reviews in detail the events of 9/11 and the 2003 invasion
of Iraq, condemning the 9/11 commission and the George W. Bush
administration for their portrayals of the role of intelligence.
Pillar offers an original approach to better informing U.S. policy,
which involves insulating intelligence management from
politicization and reducing the politically appointed layer in the
executive branch to combat slanted perceptions of foreign threats.
Pillar concludes with principles for adapting foreign policy to
inevitable uncertainties.
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