This book explores the theoretical basis of our ethical obligations
to others as self-knowing beings - this task being envisaged as an
essential supplement to a traditional ethic of respect for persons.
Authoritative knowledge of others brings with it certain
obligations, which are reflected in (inter alia) the moral and
legal safeguards designed to ensure that certain information is
'put out of play' for job selection purposes etc. However, the
theoretical basis for such obligations has never been fully
clarified. This book begins by identifying a distinctive class of
'interpretive' moral wrongs (including stereotyping, discrimination
and objectification). It then shows how our obligations in respect
of these wrongs can be understood, drawing on insights from the
tradition of philosophical reflection on "recognition." The book
will be of interest to anyone concerned with the adequacy of a
modern ethic of respect for persons - particularly in applied and
professional ethics.
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