As many formerly authoritarian regimes have been replaced by
democratic governments in Latin America, Eastern Europe, and
elsewhere, questions have arisen about the stability and durability
of these new governments. One concern has to do with the
institutional arrangements for governing bequeathed to the new
democratic regimes by their authoritarian predecessors and with the
related issue of whether presidential or parliamentary systems work
better for the consolidation of democracy.
In this book, Peter Siavelis takes a close look at the important
case of Chile, which had a long tradition of successful legislative
resolution of conflict but was left by the Pinochet regime with a
changed institutional framework that greatly strengthened the
presidency at the expense of the legislature. Weakening of the
legislature combined with an exclusionary electoral system,
Siavelis argues, undermines the ability of Chile's National
Congress to play its former role as an arena of accommodation,
creating serious obstacles to interbranch cooperation and,
ultimately, democratic governability.
Unlike other studies that contrast presidential and
parliamentary systems in the large, Siavelis examines a variety of
factors, including socioeconomic conditions and characteristics of
political parties, that affect whether or not one of these systems
will operate more or less successfully at any given time. He also
offers proposals for institutional reform that could mitigate the
harm he expects the current political structure to produce.
General
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