The Political Economy of Democratic Institutions (Hardcover)

Majority rules are generally unstable and not binding for future voters, and so are insufficient for the required security of a market economy. In this challenging book, Peter Moser argues that stability can be achieved by democratic political institutions limiting the influence of majorities. Peter Moser examines the contribution to stable policy choices of a wide range of political institutions including constitutional rules, the organizational structure of legislatures and administrative and judicial procedures. He contributes new insights about the importance of decision rules in democracies by combining theory with empirical studies. He analyses legislative procedures in the US, the European Union and Switzerland, tests a novel explanation for central bank independence, discusses the implications of political decision rules for regulatory behavior, and provides a concise survey of recent critical research on democratic institutions. This book will be particularly welcomed by public choice scholars as well as other economists and political scientists interested in the role of democratic institutions.

General

Imprint:	Edward Elgar Publishing Ltd
Country of origin:	United Kingdom
Series:	The Locke Institute series
Release date:	May 2000
Authors:	Peter Moser
Dimensions:	234 x 156mm (L x W)
Format:	Hardcover
Pages:	208
ISBN-13:	978-1-85898-966-2
Categories:	Books > Business & Economics > Economics > Political economy Books > Business & Economics > Economics > Economic systems > General Books > Social sciences > Politics & government > Political control & freedoms > Human rights > General Promotions
LSN:	1-85898-966-3
Barcode:	9781858989662

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