This title features contributions from James Alexander, Michael
Beenstock, Philip Booth, Eamonn Butler, Tim Congdon, Laurence
Copeland, Kevin Dowd, John Greenwood, Samuel Gregg, John Kay, David
Llewellyn, Alan Morrison, D. R Myddelton, Anna Schwartz and
Geoffrey Wood. This book challenges the myth that the recent
banking crisis was caused by insufficient statutory regulation of
financial markets. Though it finds that statutory regulation
failed, and that market participants took more risks than they
should have done, it appears that statutory regulation made matters
worse rather than better. Furthermore the fifteen experts who have
contributed to this study find that government policy failed in
other respects too. As with the boom and bust that led to the Great
Depression, loose monetary policy on both sides of the Atlantic
helped to promote an asset price bubble and credit boom which, at
some stage, was bound to have serious consequences. Rejecting the
failed approach of discretionary detailed regulation of the
financial system, the authors instead propose specific and incisive
regulatory tools that are designed to target, in a non-intrusive
way, particular weaknesses in a banking system that is backed by
deposit insurance. This study, by some of the most eminent authors
in the field, is essential reading for all those who are interested
in the policy implications of recent events in financial markets.
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