The European Union s (EU) membership conditionality has been
perceived as a highly effective means of influence on non-member
states in the run-up to the 2004 and 2007 enlargements. According
to the incentive-based explanation that dominates the literature,
conditionality has been particularly effective when the EU offered
a credible membership incentive and when governments did not
consider the domestic costs of compliance threatening to their hold
on power.
This volume challenges much of the existing work on EU
enlargement and postcommunist transition, however, by testing the
conditionality thesis in the post-accession setting. Whereas a
conditionality hypothesis would predict deteriorating compliance
among the newest member states, several contributions here actually
find the opposite. Enduring compliance among postcommunist states
with the acquis, as well as with less formally institutionalized EU
preferences for economic liberalization and minority protection,
calls into question the role that conditionality plays in eliciting
conformity. Simultaneously, support for the conditionality
hypothesis in areas such as political party development and EU
relations with Turkey and the western Balkans suggests
conditionality s effects vary across countries and issues. As the
first study to systematically examine the relationship between
international institutions and postcommunist states after
enlargement, this volume provides new insights into how external
actors exercise their power in domestic politics.
This book was published as a special issue of the Journal of
European Public Policy.
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