Executive Compensation surveys the extant literature on this
important topic. The first section starts with a discussion of the
theory of executive compensation, in which the author identifies
two major approaches. The first arises from the theory of optimal
compensation contracting and focuses on the composition of pay,
arguing that the composition of pay is set to attract good
executives (to solve the adverse selection problem) and motivate
them to work hard (the moral hazard problem). The second approach
focuses on the level of pay and posits that managers have a
considerable degree of power in setting their own wages and use
their power to extract excessive pay or rents from the
shareholders. The second section reviews the evidence on both the
composition and level of pay and how it has changed over time,
treating each component. The author also discusses the composition
of pay in countries around the world and in specific industries.
The third section describes who decides pay composition and levels.
Finally, the fourth section, concludes by examining how the
structure of pay has real consequences for firms.
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