This book deals with two significant issues: the peculiar and
paradoxical question of why regular armies, better suited to
fighting conventional high-intensity wars, adopt inappropriate
measures when fighting guerilla wars; and the evolution of the
Indian army's counterinsurgency doctrine over the last decade. In
addition, the book also includes the first detailed analysis of the
trajectory of the army's counterinsurgency doctrine, arguing that
while it was consolidated only over the last decade, the essential
elements of the doctrine may in fact be traced back to the army's
first confrontation with the Naga guerillas in the 1950s. It
outlines the three essential elements that make up the Indian
army's counterinsurgency doctrine: that there are no military
solutions to an insurgency; that military force can only help to
reduce levels of violence to enable political solutions; and that
there should be limited use of military force. Rajagopalan argues
that international circumstances - particularly the need to counter
conventional military threats from Pakistan and China - led to a
counterinsurgency doctrine that had a strong conventional war bias.
This bias also conditioned the organisational culture of the Indian
army.
General
Is the information for this product incomplete, wrong or inappropriate?
Let us know about it.
Does this product have an incorrect or missing image?
Send us a new image.
Is this product missing categories?
Add more categories.
Review This Product
No reviews yet - be the first to create one!
Welcome to Loot.co.za!
Sign in / Register |Wishlists & Gift Vouchers |Help | Advanced search
