This book investigates the self-organizing responses of governments
and interests to the institutional collective action (ICA) dilemmas
of particular concern to students of federalism, urban governance,
and regional management of natural resources. ICA dilemmas arise in
fragmented systems whenever decisions by one independent formal
authority do not consider costs or benefits imposed on others. The
ICA framework analyzes networks, joint projects, partnerships, and
other mechanisms developed by affected parties to mitigate ICA
decision externalities. These mechanisms play a widespread but
little-understood role in federalist systems by reshaping
incentives in order to encourage coordination/cooperation. The
empirical studies of urban service delivery and regional
integration of regional resource management address three
questions: How does a given mechanism mitigate costs of
uncoordinated decisions? What incentives do potential members have
to create the mechanism? How do incentives induced by the
mitigating mechanism affect its sustainability in a changing
environment and its adaptability to other ICA dilemmas?
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