Metaethical Subjectivism (Paperback)

Metaethical subjectivism, the idea that the truth or falsity of moral statements is contingent upon the attitudes or conventions of observers, is often regarded as a lurid philosophical doctrine which generates much psychological resistance to its acceptance. In this accessible book, Richard Double, presents a vigorous defense of metaethical subjectivism, arguing that the acceptance of this doctrine need have no deleterious effects upon theorizing either in normative ethics or in moral practice. Proceeding from a 'worldview' methodology Double criticizes the rival doctrine of metaethical objectivism for lacking both 'completeness' and 'soundness', argues that a defense of metaethical subjectivism requires no special semantic analysis of moral language and defends the plausibility of metaethical subjectivism as explaining key intractable disagreements in moral philosophy. Double concludes by suggesting that the acceptance of metaethical subjectivism is better for constructing theories of normative ethics and moral practice than is metaethical objectivism.

General

Imprint:	Routledge
Country of origin:	United Kingdom
Release date:	March 2017
First published:	2006
Authors:	Richard Double
Dimensions:	234 x 156 x 18mm (L x W x T)
Format:	Paperback
Pages:	138
ISBN-13:	978-1-138-26301-7
Categories:	Books > Humanities > Philosophy > Topics in philosophy > Metaphysics & ontology Books > Humanities > Philosophy > Topics in philosophy > Ethics & moral philosophy > General Books > Philosophy > Topics in philosophy > Ethics & moral philosophy > General Books > Philosophy > Topics in philosophy > Metaphysics & ontology
LSN:	1-138-26301-X
Barcode:	9781138263017

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