Starting from a social-scientific view of human nature which
assumes that individuals behave egoistically, U. of Michigan
political scientist Axelrod seeks to account for cooperative
behavior - through computer games. Axelrod invited eminent game
theorists from economics, psychology, and other fields to enter a
tournament centered on the now-famous Prisoner's Dilemma: is it in
the interests of each of two individuals to cooperate or not
cooperate under specific circumstances? (Briefly, it is in the
interests of both parties to claim innocence and receive a middling
punishment than for one to tell on the other; but it is in the
interests of each separately to tell, not knowing what the other
will do.) Programs were submitted for this "iterated" Prisoner's
Dilemma game - i.e., there would be a continuous sequence of moves
rather than one single choice - and the winner turned out to be
"TIT FOR TAT": a solution which said that after the first move, the
second player would reciprocate. When pitted against more
complicated strategies, the model of reciprocity always won. This
leads Axelrod to the conclusion that in a context of repeated
interaction, a pattern of behaving "nicely" will dominate a pattern
of "meanness," and result in cooperative behavior. (Axelrod ran his
tournament twice, the second time with many more participants and
with all of them informed of the outcome of the first tournament;
the TIT FOR TAT entry won again.) If non-game players intuitively
respond that this is a strange way to state the obvious, Axelrod's
turn to a historical example seen through TIT FOR TAT eyes shows
that this is indeed the case. The example is WW I trench warfare
and the well-known case of fraternization across the trenches. With
the same soldiers facing each other day after day, some individuals
on both sides adopted a strategy of not trying to shoot each other;
only outsiders, not part of the game, broke the peace (e.g.,
lobbing artillery shells from a distance). Axelrod thinks his model
explains the phenomenon, but it may just as well be said that the
phenomenon explains the model. His lame suggestions for "players"
in diplomacy and business are to get to know each other and to
remember that the game will go on for a while. Then act nice, but
retaliate immediately if the other side "defects," forcing them to
be nice too. Not a breakthrough. (Kirkus Reviews)
How can co-operation emerge in a world of self-seeking egoists -
whether superpowers, businesses, or individuals - when there is no
central authority to police their actions? The author explores this
central question, and its implications in this age of nuclear
weapons and arms talks.
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