If Russia is to become a viable democracy, it will need a viable
state to make and enforce decisions that nurture societal cohesion
and sustain complex economic activity. Armed forces are essential
attributes of viable modern states, but what happens when states
undergo major structural changes? What was the military's
contribution to the end of the Soviet Union and the rise of
post-Soviet Russia?
The Soldier in Russian Politics is the first study to go beyond
familiar accounts of the main events that brought down the Soviet
state and began its reconstruction. It captures the interplay
between soldier and civilian politicians in a major political
history based on solid political-sociological analysis. Barylski
uses the study of civil-military relations to explore new political
and intellectual conditions and explain the historic relationship
between changes in Western models of Russian reality and political
change in the former Soviet Union.
Examining the military's participation in every major,
twentieth-century, political change from 1917 to 1991, Barylski
demonstrates that every deep political transformation in Russia has
military dimensions. Barylski discusses how the Russian
presidency's power to command and control the military without
legislative checks and balances led to armed conflict with
Parliament in October 1993 and to the Chechen war of 1994-1996, and
is unhealthy for long term democratic development. Barylski
analyzes ministers of defense Yazov, Shaposhnikov, Grachev, and
Rodionov as political actors, traces the careers of ambitious
political soldiers such as Aleksandr Lebed and Aleksandr Rutskoi,
and describes the military's growing political alienation from the
Yeltsin administration. His final chapters cover the presidential
elections, the short-lived Yeltsin-Lebed political alliance, the
tensions associated with Yeltsin's ailments, and Yeltsin's efforts
to rebuild his personal power political effectiveness.
The Soldier in Russian Politics presents political history in an
incisive and objective manner. It applauds the progressive
officers, soldiers, and politicians where decisions minimized
bloodshed and prevented civil war. But it also warns that civilian
and military leaders can make mistakes which cause political
institutional failure, violence, and dictatorship. This book will
interest political scientists, political sociologists, students of
Russian and soviet politics, and all military historians and
professionals.
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