This book introduces new concepts for cooperative game theory, and
particularly solutions that determine the distribution of a
coalitional surplus among the members of the coalition. It also
addresses several generalizations of cooperative game theory.
Drawing on methods of welfare economics, new value solutions are
derived for Non-Transferable Utility games with and without
differences of bargaining power among the members of the coalition.
Cooperation in intertemporal games is examined, and conditions that
permit the reduction of these games to games in coalition function
form are outlined. Biform games and games that combine
non-cooperative search and matching of coalition members with
cooperative solutions (i.e., efficient contracts) within the
coalition are considered.
General
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