Ronald Dworkin argues that Americans have been systematically
misled about what their Constitution is, and how judges decide what
it means. The Constitution, he observes, grants individual rights
in extremely abstract terms. The First Amendment prohibits the
passing of laws that "abridge the freedom of speech"; the Fifth
Amendment insists on "due process of law"; and the Fourteenth
Amendment demands "equal protection of the laws" for all persons.
What does that abstract language mean when it is applied to the
political controversies that divide Americans-about affirmative
action and racial justice, abortion, euthanasia, capital
punishment, censorship, pornography, and homosexuality, for
example? Judges, and ultimately the justices of the Supreme Court,
must decide for everyone, and that gives them great power. How
should they decide? Dworkin defends a particular answer to that
question, which he calls the "moral reading" of the Constitution.
He argues that the Bill of Rights must be understood as setting out
general moral principles about liberty and equality and dignity,
and that private citizens, lawyers, and finally judges must
interpret and apply those general principles by posing and trying
to answer more concrete moral questions. Is freedom to choose
abortion really a basic moral right and would curtailing that right
be a deep injustice, for example? Why? In the detailed discussions
of individual constitutional issues that form the bulk of the book,
Dworkin shows that our judges do decide hard constitutional cases
by posing and answering such concrete moral questions. Indeed he
shows that that is the only way they can decide those cases. But
most judges-and most politicians and most law professors-pretend
otherwise. They say that judges must never treat constitutional
issues as moral issues because that would be "undemocratic"-it
would mean that judges were substituting their own moral
convictions for those of Congressmen and state legislators who had
been elected by the people. So they insist that judges can, and
should, decide in some more mechanical way which involves no fresh
moral judgment on their part. The result, Dworkin shows, has been
great constitutional confusion. Is the premise at the core of this
confusion really sound? Is the moral reading-the only reading of
the American Constitution that makes sense-really undemocratic? In
spirited and illuminating discussions both of the great
constitutional cases of recent years, and of general constitutional
principles, Dworkin argues, to the contrary, that the distinctly
American version of government under principle, based on the moral
reading of the Constitution, is in fact the best account of what
democracy really is.
General
Imprint: |
Harvard University Press
|
Country of origin: |
United States |
Release date: |
April 1997 |
First published: |
April 1997 |
Authors: |
Ronald Dworkin
|
Dimensions: |
235 x 156 x 25mm (L x W x T) |
Format: |
Paperback
|
Pages: |
416 |
ISBN-13: |
978-0-674-31928-8 |
Categories: |
Books >
Law >
Laws of other jurisdictions & general law >
General
|
LSN: |
0-674-31928-1 |
Barcode: |
9780674319288 |
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