The type identity theory, according to which types of mental state
are identical to types of physical state, fell out of favour for
some years but is now being considered with renewed interest. Many
philosophers are critically re-examining the arguments which were
marshalled against it, finding in the type identity theory both
resources to strengthen a comprehensive, physicalistic metaphysics
and a useful tool in understanding the relationship between
developments in psychology and new results in neuroscience. This
volume brings together leading philosophers of mind, whose essays
challenge in new ways the standard objections to type identity
theory, such as the multiple realizability objection and the modal
argument. Other essays show how cognitive science and neuroscience
are lending new support to type identity theory and still others
provide, extend and improve traditional arguments concerning the
theory's explanatory power.
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