Because authoritarian regimes like North Korea can impose the costs
of sanctions on their citizens, these regimes constitute "hard
targets." Yet authoritarian regimes may also be immune-and even
hostile-to economic inducements if such inducements imply reform
and opening. This book captures the effects of sanctions and
inducements on North Korea and provides a detailed reconstruction
of the role of economic incentives in the bargaining around the
country's nuclear program. Stephan Haggard and Marcus Noland draw
on an array of evidence to show the reluctance of the North Korean
leadership to weaken its grip on foreign economic activity. They
argue that inducements have limited effect on the regime, and
instead urge policymakers to think in terms of gradual strategies.
Hard Target connects economic statecraft to the marketization
process to understand North Korea and addresses a larger debate
over the merits and demerits of "engagement" with adversaries.
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