In Russia and Armed Persuasion, Stephen J. Cimbala argues that
Russia's war planners and political leaders must make painful
adjustments in their thinking about the relationship between
military art and policy in the twenty-first century. Russia must
master the use of force for persuasion, not just destruction. As
the author shows, military persuasion requires that Russian leaders
master the politico-military complexity of crisis management,
deterrence and arms control, and the limitation of ends and means
in war. Russia now has scarce resources to devote to defense and
can no longer afford the stick-only diplomacy and strategy that
have characterized some of its recent past. Russian and Soviet
military thinking historically emphasized the blunderbuss and total
war: overwhelming mass, firepower, and conflicts of annihilation or
prolonged attrition. However, historical experience also forced
Russia and the Soviet Union to come to grips with crisis management
and with limited aims and means in the conduct of war. On the one
hand, Russia failed the test of military persuasion in its
management of the July 1914 crisis that plunged Europe into World
War I. On the other hand, the Soviet Union did adjust to the
requirements of the nuclear age for crisis management, deterrence,
and limited war. Using this mixed record of Russian and Soviet
success and failure in twentieth century experience, Cimbala argues
that Russia can, and must, improve in the twenty-first century.
According to the author, the first decades of this century will
pose at least three immediate challenges to Russia's military
persuasion. Russia must continue to pursue strategic nuclear arms
control and arms reductions, with the United States and avoid
re-starting the Cold War by means of an ill-considered race in
missile defenses. Second, Russia must maintain a surer grip on the
military information revolution, especially as it pertains to the
management of Russia's nuclear deterrent. Third, Russia must
develop forces that are more flexible in small wars and peace
operations: its recent experiences in Chechnya show that it has a
long way to go in using economy of force as a military persuader.
Cimbala's original analysis demonstrates the similar features in
apparently dissimilar, or even opposite, events and processes. For
example, he shows how the problem of military persuasion applies
equally to the challenge of managing a nuclear crisis and the
problem of low-intensity war. In each case, the dilemma is
calibrating the military means to the political ends.
Controversially, the author argues against both military and
academic traditionalists, contending that the complexity of the
force-policy relationship in the next century will reward the
subtle users of military power and that others will be subject to a
'Gulliver effect' of diminishing returns.
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