Voters today often desert a preferred candidate for a more
viable second choice to avoid wasting their vote. Likewise, parties
to a dispute often find themselves unable to agree on a fair
division of contested goods. In "Mathematics and Democracy," Steven
Brams, a leading authority in the use of mathematics to design
decision-making processes, shows how social-choice and game theory
could make political and social institutions more democratic. Using
mathematical analysis, he develops rigorous new procedures that
enable voters to better express themselves and that allow
disputants to divide goods more fairly.
One of the procedures that Brams proposes is "approval voting,"
which allows voters to vote for as many candidates as they like or
consider acceptable. There is no ranking, and the candidate with
the most votes wins. The voter no longer has to consider whether a
vote for a preferred but less popular candidate might be wasted. In
the same vein, Brams puts forward new, more equitable procedures
for resolving disputes over divisible and indivisible goods.
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